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Marketing Contracts, Overconfidence,
and Timing in the Canadian Wheat Market
Fabio L. Mattos and Stefanie A. Fryza
This paper investigates factors that impact marketing performance in the Canadian wheat market.

Using data provided by the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) for six crop years, results indicate
that producers were not able to profitably use all marketing contracts offered by the CWB,
earlier pricing tended to generate better performance, there was a negative relationship between

activeness and performance (suggesting overconfidence in marketing skills), and performance
was generally worse in volatile crop years. Further analysis reveals some of these findings differ
when outperforming and underperforming producers are investigated separately, particularly with

respect to activeness and volatility.
Key words: Canadian Wheat Board, marketing contracts, overconfidence, performance, timing

Introduction

Marketing decisions are an important dimension of farm management. Dhuyvetter, Morris, and
Kastens found evidence that "price has become increasingly significant in explaining profitability
differences across producers" (2011, p. 14), even though there are other farm management attributes
(e.g., costs and yields) that are more significant when explaining differences in profits across
producers. In addition, Zulauf et al. (2006) argued that even if price is typically found to have
little impact in helping producers profitably distinguish themselves from other producers, it is still
important to explain producers' variation in management performance across time.
Previous studies investigated marketing performance using data on individual transactions or
average prices received by a representative sample of producers (Anderson and Brorsen, 2005; Dietz
et al., 2009; Hagedorn et al., 2005). These studies explored marketing performance by addressing
the question of how producers tend to perform relative to a given benchmark. Their results showed
evidence that marketing performance is equal to or above the market benchmark (Anderson and
Brorsen, 2005) or generally lies within the middle third of the price range (Dietz et al., 2009;
Hagedorn et al., 2005).
Another group of studies used data on marketing recommendations by advisory services or
individual transactions by producers to explore the impact of marketing styles on performance

(Cabrini, Irwin, and Good, 2007; Cunningham III, Brorsen, and Anderson, 2007). Both studies
used marketing activeness (i.e., how often producers try to time the market to obtain higher prices)

and time of the year when crop is sold as style characteristics, while Cabrini, Irwin, and Good
(2007) also included intensity of futures and options use. Results are somewhat mixed. While it was
generally found that selling later in the marketing window led to lower performance, there were
contrasting outcomes with respect to activeness. Cabrini, Irwin, and Good (2007) found a positive
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relationship between marketing activeness and performance, while Cunningham III, Br
Anderson (2007) found the opposite.
In spite of the important findings and new insights about marketing style and per
provided by the studies above, it remains to be seen how their results compare to larger s
wider geographical area and across different ranges of marketing performance. The grain
system in Canada offers a unique opportunity to explore performance. All wheat prod
Western Canada and sold for human consumption or export must be marketed through t

Wheat Board (CWB). The CWB is the largest grain-marketing agency in Canada an

responsible for approximately 90% of all wheat produced in the country in the last ten y
producers must execute all wheat sales through a single agency, the CWB has records

exactly how all producers chose to market their wheat and the prices they received at the en
crop year.

This paper investigates factors that impact marketing performance in the Canadian wheat market.

The key questions addressed are whether producers can identify and take advantage of profit
opportunities using different marketing contracts, whether time of the year when wheat is priced
or price variability affect performance, and whether producers have better information or analytical
ability to outperform the markets (or if they are overconfident in their ability to market their
wheat). Data were provided by the CWB and are comprised of marketing instruments chosen by
each producer and the respective prices received from 2003/04 to 2008/09. The sample of wheat
producers is also divided into categories according to their marketing performance. Each subsample
is investigated in order to explore how each category differs with respect to the impact of contract
usage, timing, activeness, and price variability on marketing performance.
Despite its relevance in farm management, it is alarming to realize that prevailing ideas about
marketing decisions and performance still do not rely on a large body of evidence (Hagedorn et al.,
2005). This study can shed more light on the debate about marketing style and performance because
it examines a larger sample of producers in a unique market structure. Producers and the CWB can
use this research to improve the design and communication of marketing alternatives developed for
producers. Results may also be relevant for government agencies, extension programs, and market
advisory services, which might be able to gather more insight about producers' marketing behavior.
Finally, findings from this research can be particularly relevant for all market participants as Canada
moves towards the deregulation of its wheat market, which will allow producers to market their grain

outside the CWB and directly with elevators, grain companies, and other buyers in an open market.

Background
The CWB is the largest grain-marketing agency in Canada and sole marketer for wheat produced in
Western Canada, encompassing the provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and the Peace

River area of British Columbia. These regions produce approximately 90% of all wheat grown in
Canada. The CWB will cease to be the sole marketer of wheat following the 2011/2012 crop year,2
but during the time period encompassed by this study it still centralized all wheat sales in Western
Canada. The CWB offered different marketing alternatives, allowing producers to choose a program
that met their own needs and preferences regarding return, risk, and cash flow.

The oldest pricing alternative is pool pricing, which has been the main marketing program for
Western Canada wheat since the 1930s. The pool worked by pooling all wheat from producers in
Western Canada to be traded by the CWB, giving the organization more market power to obtain
1 Recent changes in the Canadian marketing system will allow producers to sell their wheat without the CWB starting in
the 2012/2013 crop year, but all wheat sales for export and human consumption had to go through the CWB during the time
period considered in this study.

2 On October 18, 2011, the Canadian government introduced Bill C-18 to remove the CWB as the sole seller of wheat
produced in Western Canada. The Marketing Freedom for Grain Farmers Act passed on November 28, 2011, ratifying this
change.
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higher prices.3 Pool revenues were then distributed such that all producers r

price per unit regardless of when and to whom their grain was sold. With the po

an initial payment when deliveries were made to the grain handling facility an

as sales were completed throughout the crop year. The final pool price was kno
of the crop year, which extends from August 1 to July 31.

The CWB developed marketing contracts collectively known as Producer
(PPO) to allow producers to price their own grain and provide flexibility to m
(Canadian Wheat Board, 2012). These contracts were first offered in the 200
allowed producers to make their own marketing decisions. However, the CWB
these contracts. PPO contracts also differed from pool accounts in terms of
Producers still received an initial payment when they delivered their wheat t
facility, but their final payment would come within ten business days. Produ
marketing contracts could receive their full payment before the end of the crop
The CWB developed five types of PPO contracts: Early Payment Options
Contracts (FPC), Basis Price Contracts (BPC), Daily Price Contracts (DPC), and
was mainly used for cash-flow management; its price was just a fixed propor
pool price. The FPC offered a daily fixed price derived from the wheat futur
the Minneapolis Grain Exchange (MGE). In principle, the FPC resembled a fu
BPC was fundamentally a basis contract and allowed producers to lock in a fu
the MGE) and basis at different times during the marketing window, so thei
known after both components were determined. The DPC and FlexPro offer
cash price based on wheat traded at the port of Vancouver; hence, it worked e

contract. Note that the DPC was terminated after the 2007/08 crop year and
the 2008/09 crop year. For the purpose of this paper, since the DPC and FlexP
in their functions and specifications, they are combined into one contract and
as "DPC."

Producers could sell their wheat using any combination of these marketing contracts and
pool. The marketing window during which producers could allocate their wheat to each marketi
program varied across contracts. In most years the marketing window for the BPC and FPC star
about five months before the beginning of the crop year and ended approximately three month
into the crop year.4 As for the DPC and FlexPro, producers had the entire crop year to price th
grain, but they needed to indicate the tonnage they wanted to price with these contracts prior to th
beginning of the crop year.
Previous Studies

Few studies have empirically explored individual characteristics that impact marketing performan

of agricultural producers. Cunningham III, Brorsen, and Anderson (2007) investigated wh

producers in Oklahoma from 1992 to 2001 and explored how marketing activeness and timing
impacted performance. They found no statistically significant evidence that activeness in futures a

options markets was related to pricing performance, indicating that producers who actively marketed

their grain to obtain higher prices were not successful. Their results also showed that produce
who sold their grain later in the marketing year tended to receive lower prices. Cabrini, Irwin
and Good (2007) investigated marketing recommendations from advisory programs in corn and
soybean markets between 1995 and 2004. They focused on the impact of three style characteristi
on marketing performance, including intensity of futures and options contracts use, marketin
activeness, and seasonality of sales. Results revealed that more active programs exhibited highe
prices, suggesting that services recommending active strategies exhibited superior information o

3 As a single agent selling Western Canadian wheat in the domestic and world markets, the CWB is able to consistentl
trade larger volumes than any individual producer in Canada.
4 The crop year runs from August 1 to July 31.
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analytical skills. However, the authors indicated that results could have been driven b
advisory service, so the model was estimated without the top-performing program. Res

that the positive relationship between performance and activeness was significant only f
Cabrini, Irwin, and Good (2007) also found a negative relationship between performance
traded in futures and options markets, which they indicated was partially explained by
fees. Finally, their findings showed that pricing later in the marketing window led to lowe
corn, while the opposite results emerged for soybeans (note that statistical significance
for soybeans).
The negative relationship between time of year and performance found for wheat

in those studies suggests that producers who stored longer tended to receive low

Cunningham III, Brorsen, and Anderson (2007) explained this using ideas presented by
and Anderson (2001), who discussed implications of behavioral finance for agricultura
and explained psychological biases that can affect marketing decisions. They argued tha
might store longer than is optimal because they are overconfident in their abilities to i
best time to price their grain or because producers exhibit myopic loss aversion (Cunn
Brorsen, and Anderson, 2007). Those ideas also apply to the discussion of marketing acti
performance.

While Cunningham III, Brorsen, and Anderson (2007) found that producers using active
strategies perform no better than those following passive strategies, Cabrini, Irwin, and Good (2007)

indicated that producers may be able to profit by adopting active strategies suggested by advisory
services. Still, none of them found a significant negative relationship between marketing activeness

and performance, which would suggest that producers were overconfident in their abilities to time
the market. In a survey of producers and extension marketing economists, Schroeder et al. (1998)
found that both groups believed in the existence of marketing strategies that allows producers to
time the market and obtain higher prices. In that survey, approximately 80% of subjects said they
agreed or strongly agreed that "preharvest hedging strategies are available which allow producers,
on average, to receive a higher price than always selling at harvest" or "there are market timing
strategies available to producers which allow them to increase price received." In this context,
overconfidence occurs when individuals believe they have superior skills to outperform their peers,
even though their performance shows otherwise.
Research Method

A regression model similar to Cabrini, Irwin, and Good (2007) and Cunningham III, B

and Anderson (2007) is used to investigate factors that impact marketing performance fo
producers in Western Canada:
(1)

Performanceit = a + [if%FPCit + [3n%BPClt + iio%DPCit + S'/'iming,, +
7 ActiveneSSi 4- θ Vcl-)- A4 DAlberta j ~t~ ^sDSaskatchewan,i "Ί~ ^i,t :

where Performance^ is the marketing performance of producer i in year t; %FPCU, %BPC,t,
and %DPCij are the percentages of producer Γ s total crop priced with each marketing contract
(FPC, BPC, and DPC) in year t\ Timingi , indicates the time during the marketing window in which
producer i priced his grain with one of the marketing contracts in year t\ Acivenessi is a measure of
marketing activeness for producer i; Var, is a measure of price variability in the wheat market for
crop year t: and DAibena i and DSaskatchewan,i are dummy variables for the provinces of Alberta and
Saskatchewan.

Performancej:t is calculated as the difference between the price producers received and a
benchmark (price receivedjj — benchmarkt). Price received is the final price received by each
producer for their wheat using a FPC, BPC, DPC, or any combination of these three contracts. Even
if a producer also delivered part of his crop to the pool, only prices received from the marketing

Mattos and Fryza Marketing Contracts, Overconfidence, and Timing 473

contracts are considered when calculating price received. The benchmark
is the CWB pool price. The model explores producers' marketing perform
compared to what they could have received if they had chosen to let the CW
the pool. Therefore, if the final price received by producer i in year t is ab

Performanceij is positive (negative).
The percentage of grain priced with each marketing contract (%FPC, %
how much wheat producers try to market by themselves outside the pool.
wheat producers—the EPO—is not considered here because its price is sim
of the expected pool price; it essentially keeps producers in the pool. The
calculated as tonnes priced with each contract divided by total tonnes marke
t. Total tonnes marketed in year t includes the whole amount that a produc
contracts and the pool. Since wheat producers could have also delivered the
or the EPO, the sum of %FPC, %BPC, and %DPC is typically less than on
these variables—%FPC, %BPC, and %DPC—indicate more (fewer) tonne
and fewer (more) in the pool, suggesting producers might (not) perceive opp
pricing their wheat outside the pool. A positive (negative) relationship bet
performance indicates that producers who price larger portions of their
achieve better (worse) performance compared to the pool.

The variable Timing^, is used to indicate the time within the marketing
i priced a marketing contract in year t. A single marketing window is a
during each crop year. The marketing window is assumed to start when the
and go until the deadline of the last contract. For example, in 2006/07 th
first available in February 2006 and the DPC was last available in July 2007
had a seventeen-month window to make their marketing decision. Timing

terms, starting at zero for the first month and ending at one for the last mo

wheat. Therefore Timingif is calculated by dividing the number of mon
of the marketing window (starting at zero) to the moment the grain is
of months of the marketing period. This procedure is adopted because m
different lengths across crop years. If a producer prices his wheat with mo
uses the same contract more than once during the year), weighted average

Timingif value, and the weights are given by the quantity of tonnes priced
relationship between performance and Timingif suggests that pricing late
(worse) performance. On the other hand, a negative relationship suggests p
to better (worse) performance.
The concept of marketing activeness adopted in this research follows Cu
and Anderson (2007) and Cabrini, Irwin, and Good (2007) to assess whethe
passive marketing strategy (e.g., price their wheat at the same time of the

year) or try to time the market by adopting more active strategies.5 More sp

of Activenessi is based on Cunningham III, Brorsen, and Anderson (2007)

proportion of wheat that a producer priced with contracts in each week o

relative to his total production is created. Then the tonne-weighted averag

is calculated for each producer i in year t as in equation (2), where wk,j)W

marketed, wvoliJtW is tonnes marketed in week w, and tvolu is total tonn
year. For example, if a producer used marketing contracts to price 50% of h

seventh week and another 25% during the ninth week of the marketing win

average week marketed would be equal to 8. The measure of marketing acti

is given by the standard deviation of awk-Lt series calculated as in equation (3

5 Cabrini, Irwin, and Good (2007) identified four measures of activeness in their research b

no one measure that can be used to describe the differences in degrees of activeness. Some o
marketing strategies dealing with futures and options contracts. In the current research, data
individual producers are not available.
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of years in which producer i marketed wheat, and awki is the mean of awklt for each prod

crop years. Note that producers had to use marketing contracts (FPC, BPC, or DPC) in a
crop years in order to be considered in the calculation of activeness for this model.

(2)

(3)

The activeness measure is then standardized so it can be expressed in terms of standar
relative to the marketing activeness of the average sampled producer.6 A higher activ
suggests the producer is more active compared to the average producer's strategy, m
year the producer prices his wheat in different weeks. Therefore, a positive (negative)
between marketing activeness and performance indicates that greater activeness leads
(worse) performance. These relationships can be used to explore overconfidence. Produ
believe they have better information or analytical skills to outperform the benchmark
more active in their marketing strategies. If greater activeness leads to poor performanc
producers are actually overconfident in their abilities to outperform the benchmark.
A positive relationship between marketing activeness and performance does not ne
follow a positive relationship between contracts usage (%FPC, %BPC, %DPC) and perfo
The fact that producers price larger portions of their crop with marketing contracts
automatically indicate that they have a more active marketing strategy. For example,
can market all his grain using contracts and do so during the same week every year,
activeness equal to zero. A producer could also try to actively use contracts to time the m
year, but commit only a small fraction of his crop to these contracts while leaving most
in the CWB pool. In this case, it is possible that the producer shows a positive relations
activeness and performance but not necessarily a positive relationship between contract
performance.
The variable Vart measures price variability in the wheat market in each crop year. It is given
by the coefficient of variation of the nearby price of the wheat futures contract traded at the MGE.
The mean and standard deviation of the daily nearby futures price is calculated and one value for
Var, (coefficient of variation) is obtained for each crop year. The MGE futures price was chosen
as a reference for the wheat market, since Vart is supposed to serve as a general measure of price
variability. 7

Finally, three provinces are encompassed by the CWB marketing system: Alberta, Saskatchewan

and Manitoba.8 The dummy variables take a value of one if producer i is located in Alberta
(■DAiberta,i) or Saskatchewan (DSaskatchewan,.i) and zero otherwise, thus indicating marketing
performance relative to Manitoba.
Data

Data for this research were provided by the CWB and include all producers who grew
Western Red Spring (CWRS) wheat from 2003/04 through 2008/09. The sample used

regression model only includes producers who grew CWRS wheat in at least two of the six
years and marketed their wheat using at least one of three marketing contracts (FPC, BPC

6 A standardized activeness index for producer i is calculated by subtracting the average activeness across all prod
from producer <"s activeness measure and then dividing by the standard deviation of activeness across all producers.

7 The coefficient of variation for actual daily prices offered by FPC and DPC was also calculated for each crop ye
the results were similar to the coefficient of variation for the MGE futures price.

8 A small area in the province of British Columbia is also part of the CWB system, but it was not considered in th
given the very limited number of producers from that area that used marketing contracts.
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in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. There are 7,400 producers in the dat
criteria.9 Not all producers used contracts in all six crop years: 4,088 produ

two years, 2,041 in three years, 908 in four years, 311 in five years and 52 in six

contains transactions made by each producer that indicate (i) what contracts they

wheat, (ii) how many tonnes of wheat were allocated to each contract, (iii) d
priced their wheat with contracts, (iv) final price received by each produce
contract, and (v) province. The final price received by each producer is calc
average of all prices received with each contract. The weights are the number
each contract.

Marketing performance is investigated for the entire sample of producers and also for
subgroups of outperforming and underperforming producers, such that different characteristics
among producers who perform better and worse than the CWB pool can be explored. Three criteria
are adopted to categorize producers. First, weighted average performances are calculated for each

producer across the six crop years (tonnes priced with contracts in each year are the weights),
and then the sample is divided into two groups with producers whose average performance is
positive and negative. This is a simple criterion and may be misleading if there is little difference
between positive and negative average performance around zero or high variability in individual
performance across crop years. In the first case it may not be possible to statistically distinguish
between outperforming and underperforming producers across years. In the second case a producer

could be in the group with positive (negative) average performance because he outperformed
(underperformed) the pool by a large amount in one year but underperformed (outperformed) the
pool by relatively smaller amounts in the other crop years. In this situation, the producer would be
categorized in the outperforming (underperforming) group basically because of one good (bad) year.
Thus the discussion about performance extends to more refined sets of producers. A second
criterion to categorize producers focuses on the upper and lower quartiles. Producers are ranked
according to their weighted average performance across years, and two subsets are created based

on the top and bottom 10%—the 740 producers (10% of the sample) with the highest average
performance and the 740 producers with the lowest average performance. The third criterion
categorizes producers according to their annual performance, with two subsets created: producers
whose performance was positive or negative in all years in which they used marketing contracts.11
There are 878 (645) producers whose performance was positive (negative) in all years they marketed
wheat with contracts.12

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on marketing performance and independent variables for
the entire sample and all the subsets discussed above. Statistics for the entire sample—presented
in the first column of table 1—are discussed first. Average performance for all producers was
Cdn$-16.1/tonne, indicating that the average price received by producers who used FPC, BPC, and
DPC was Cdn$16.1/tonne below the pool price between 2003/04 and 2008/09. This performance

corresponds to 6.4% of the average pool price during those six crop years.13 The maximum
performance obtained by a producer during those crop years was Cdn$336/tonne above the pool,
while the minimum was Cdn$186.7/tonne below the pool. There is diversity in the amount of

production priced with marketing contracts. FPC was used more often, followed by the BPC
and DPC. On average, producers priced 33.8% of their crops with the FPC, 12.9% with the BPC,

9 The total number of producers who grew CWRS wheat between 2003/04 and 2008/09 was 67,798; thus the sample used
in this study represents roughly 11% of all producers.

10 In all cases, producers could have used any combination of FPC, BPC, and DPC in each crop year.
1 ' Note that producers must have used contracts in at least two crop years (following an initial criterion for this study) but
not necessarily in all six crop years.

12 Out of those, 725 (569) producers used contracts in two years, 133 (67) in three years, 19 (8) in four years, 1 (1) in five
years and 0 (0) in all six years.

13 Pool prices were Cdn$211.14/tonne in 2003/04, Cdn$205.10/tonne in 2004/05, Cdn$195.14/tonne in 2005/06,
Cdn$212.89/tonne in 2006/07, Cdn$372.06/tonne in 2007/08, and Cdn$311,06/tonne in 2008/09.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
All
Producers

Variable

(Pooled
Years)

Producers Ranked by
Average Performance

Producers Categorized by Annual Performance

Across Years
Positive"

Negative"

Top

10 %b

Bottom

10 %b

All

Positive0

All

Negative0

Performance

(Cdn$/tonne)d
mean

maximum

3rd quartile
median

1st quartile
minimum

-16.1

14.3

-25.3

-49.8

27.6

-52.7

336.0

336.0

308.6

336.0

151.2

305.4

-0.0

22.7

30.3

17.0

49.6

9.1

30.7

5.0

15.3

-0.5

25.5

-77.6

19.8

-86.2

9.3

-107.6

7.8

-89.6

-186.7

-156.2

-180.4

0.0

-186.7

-77.6

-186.7

2.3
-167.6

30.8

-7.9
-45.4

%FPCe
33.8

33.1

34.0

32.6

35.7

37.2

29.3

maximum

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

3rd quartile

54.9

52.5

54.4

51.4

59.6

63.6

49.8

median

25.6

22.8

26.5

21.3

27.1

26.2

19.7

1st quartile

0.0

0.0

3.2

0.0

6.2

0.0

0.0

minimum

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

mean

%BPCe
mean

maximum

12.9

14.9

12.3

12.3

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

9.0

12.6

16.6

100.0

100.0

100.0
25.6

16.1

18.9

15.3

11.6

5.1

11.6

median

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

1 st quartile

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

minimum

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

3rd quartile

%DPCe
6.4

7.3

6.1

8.1

4.2

7.6

5.3

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

3rd quartile

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

median

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

1st quartile

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

minimum

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.5

mean

maximum

Timingf
mean

0.4

0.4

0.4

0.4

0.4

0.3

maximum

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

3rd quartile

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.6

median

0.4

0.4

0.4

0.3

0.5

0.3

0.5

1st quartile

0.3

0.2

0.3

0.2

0.3

0.2

0.3

minimum

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

(continued on next page... )
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Table 1. - continued from previous page
AH
Producers

Variable

(Pooled

Years)

Producers Ranked by
Average Performance

Producers Categorized by Annual Performance

Across Years

Positive3

Negative3

Top
10%b

Bottom

10%b

All

Positive0

All

Negative0

Activeness8
mean

0.0

maximum

5.6

-0.3

0.1

-0.3

0.1

-0.5

4.4

5.6

3.4

2.8

3.5

0.2
5.6
1.2

0.6

0.3

0.6

0.3

0.8

0.1

median

-0.1

-0.3

0.1

-0.4

0.1

-0.7

1st quartile

-0.7

-1.0

-0.5

-1.1

-0.6

-1.3

-0.7

minimum

-2.0

-2.0

-2.0

-2.0

-2.0

-2.0

-2.0

3rd quartile

Producers

7,400

1,805

5,595

740

740

878

0.2

645

Notes: aPositive (negative) refers to the subset of producers whose average performance across years was greater (less) than zero.
b Top (bottom) 10% refers to the subset of producers encompassing 10% of the sample with the highest (lowest) average performance across
years.

0 All positive (negative) refers to producers who outperformed (underperformed) the pool in all years in which they used marketing contracts.
Performance = price received minus pool price.
"Percentage of crop priced with each marketing contract.
'Timing is defined such that the first (last) month of the marketing window is equal to zero (one).
gMarketing activeness is standardized; hence the average of the entire sample is zero.

and 6.4% with the DPC. There is also diversity within contracts. The interquartile ranges for the
FPC, BPC, and DPC are 55,16, and 0 percentage points, respectively. Even though maximum usage
is often 100%, few producers used the BPC and DPC extensively compared to the FPC.
The average timing for wheat pricing is 0.4. This variable is expressed in relative terms, starting
at zero for the first month of the marketing window and ending at one for the last month of the
marketing window. Hence the average of 0.4 indicates a point just before the middle of the marketing
window. Even though there were producers who priced their crop in the first and last months of the

marketing window (minimum - 0 and maximum = 1), a larger portion of them seem to have priced
their wheat either before or close to the middle of the marketing window (the 3rd quartile is 0.5 and
the median is 0.4). The index of activeness presented in table 1 is measured in terms of standard

deviations. Since the index is standardized, the mean of the entire sample is 0 and the maximum

(minimum) value of 5.6 (-2.0) indicates a producer who was 5.6 (2.0) standard deviations more
(less) active than the average producer.
For the sample partitions, mean performances are higher by definition for outperforming
compared to underperforming producers, and interquartile ranges suggest that there is more
dispersion in performance among underperforming producers. In terms of contract usage, there are
no large differences in the descriptive statistics of percentage of crop priced with each contract across
groups of producers. Differences across groups of producers seem to emerge with respect to timing

and activeness regardless of the criteria adopted to partition the sample. Timing generally shows
lower means, medians, and 1st quartiles for outperforming groups compared to underperforming
groups, suggesting outperforming producers tend to price earlier than their underperforming peers.

Similarly, activeness presents lower means, medians, and 3rd and 1st quartiles for outperforming
producers, suggesting they adopt relatively less active strategies than underperforming producers.

The last independent variable is price variability, Vart, which is measured by the coefficient
of variation of MGE futures price and has one value for each crop year: 0.07 in 2003/04, 0.13 in
2004/05, 0.09 in both 2005/06 and 2006/07, 0.39 in 2007/08, and 0.27 in 2008/09. The crop year
with the smallest (largest) price variability was 2003/04 (2007/08). The coefficients of variation also
show that the last two years of the sample (2007/08 and 2008/09) exhibited more price variability
than the first four years (this is further illustrated in figure 1). In addition to the price variability
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Figure 1. Nearby Futures Price Traded at the Minneapolis Grain Exchange (MGE), August
2003 to July 2009 (Cdn$/tonne)

Notes: Horizontal lines indicate the average price for each crop year (August to July). Prices were converted from US$/bu to Cdn$/tonne u
the daily exchange rate released by the Bank of Canada and adopting the conversion value of 36.744 bushel equivalents per tonne.

in the wheat market, it should be noted that wheat prices started an upward movement in 2005/
which continued until 2007/08 and then reverted to a downward movement in 2008/09 (figure 1
Results

The sample used in the estimation is specifically selected to include all producers who grew and

priced CWRS wheat with a FPC, BPC, or DPC between 2003/04 and 2008/09. Considering how th
measure of marketing activeness was calculated, an additional restriction is that producers need to

have used marketing contracts in at least two crop years. Therefore it is not a random sample of whea

producers. Additionally, the regression contains unbalanced data since the number of producers
varies across years.14

Equation (1) is estimated with panel regression procedures. The index of marketing activenes

is one of the independent variables and represents an individual characteristic that var
across producers but not over time. The measure of price variability represents time-speci

effects that vary over time but not across producers. The model is tested for the presence of
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the residuals with a Breusch-Pagan test and the Breusc
Godfrey/Wooldridge test, respectively. Both null hypotheses that heteroskedasticity and serial

correlation are not present can be rejected at 1%; thus, panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) a
adopted. The regression model is estimated for the entire sample (all producers) and also for subse
of producers divided according to performance. The division of the sample is performed in order

explore how the relationship between performance and the explanatory variables may change acro
distinct levels of performance.

Point estimates of equation (1) are presented in table 2. The first column shows estimation

results for the entire sample (all producers), while the other columns contain estimates for group
of producers divided using average performance. The model with all producers is discussed firs

Estimated coefficients for the percentage of crop priced with each of the marketing contracts ar
statistically significant for all contracts, being negative for the FPC and BPC and positive for th
DPC. These results suggest that pricing larger portions of a producer's crop with FPC and BPC

(DPC) tended to reduce (improve) performance. This could have a large impact on marketin
performance. While some producers priced their whole crop ( 100%) with a FPC, the medi

14 There are 264 producers sampled in 2003/04; 2,761 in 2004/05; 1,479 in 2005/06; 5,749 in 2006/07; 6,141 in 2007/
and 3,404 in 2008/09.
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Table 2. Panel Regression Models. Dependent Variable: Performance (2003/04

Producers Categorized by Average Performance across Yea
Variable
Constant

All Producers

Positive3

Negative3

Top 10%b

Bottom 10%b

82.54*"

63.89***

81.17"*

56.91*"

(1.10)

(2.71)

(1.17)

(5.10)

(2.92)

%FPCij

-0.43"*

-0.33*"

-0.36***

-0.29***

(0.01)

(0.03)

%BPCif

-0.03**

(0.02)

%DPCij

0.08***

0.16*"

(0.03)
0.40***

-0.41*"

(0.01)
-0.12***

(0.02)
-0.04**

(0.02)

(0.04)

(0.02)

Timmgit

-64.03*"

-94.94***

-51.62*"

(2.11)

(4.58)

(2.17)

Activenessi

-2.84***

0.82

-3.18"*

(0.35)
Var,

-262.73*"

(2.93)
DAlberta

1.49*

(0.81)
DSaskatchewan

-2.32***

(0.78)
Adjusted R2

0.47

F-statistic

(0.79)
-52.52***

(7.89)
4.31"

(2.06)
3.06*

(0.34)
-298.14***

(2.98)
-0.21

(0.04)
0.28"*

(0.06)
0.57***

(0.08)
-114.70*"

(8.59)
1.41

(1.41)
92.08*"

(14.39)
6.92**

(0.82)

(3.12)

-6.17*"

3.26

(1.80)

(0.80)

0.14

0.57

(3.53)

75.18***

(0.04)
-0.29"*

(0.05)
-0.21*"

(0.07)
-23.45***

(5.49)
-5.55***

(0.98)
-371.70"*

(8.85)
-7.56***

(2.05)
-2.15

(2.34)

0.13

0.70
476.41

2,226.34

91.17

2,564.43

33.25

Observations

19,798

4,580

15,218

1,725

1,599

Producers

7,400

1,805

5,595

740

740

Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**, ***) indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level.
aProducers with positive (negative) performance are those whose weighted average performance across years is positive (negative); that is,
those who outperformed (underperformed) the pool on average.
bAll producers are ranked by average performance across years; the top (bottom) 10% refers to the subset encompassing 10% of the sample
with the highest (lowest) average performance.

value for %FPC was 25.6%. Therefore, producers who priced their whole crop with a FPC would
be expected to perform Cdn$31.99/tonne worse than producers with the median amount priced.
Findings suggest producers were not able to identify and take advantage of profit opportunities with
the FPC and BPC. On the other hand, it appears they were able to use the DPC profitably. Note
that the model adopted in this study evaluates (ex-ante) marketing strategies available during the
crop year by considering (ex-post) marketing outcomes observed at the end of the crop year. The
above results do not necessarily imply that producers failed to take profit opportunities offered by
contracts, but rather that they were not able to anticipate market developments that occurred after
their marketing decisions or some of their marketing choices turned out to be less profitable than the

Timing has a negative and statistically significant coefficient, suggesting producers who priced
their wheat earlier in the marketing window performed better compared to those who priced later.

The practical implications of this estimate could be large. Recalling that the timing variable is
defined such that the first month of the marketing window is equal to zero and the last month

is equal to one, the median value of this variable was 0.4 while the maximum value was one.
Thus producers who priced their wheat in the last month of the marketing window would have
performed Cdn$38.42/tonne worse compared to those at the median values and Cdn$64.03/tonne
worse compared to those who priced in the first month.

480 December 2012

Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics

The estimated coefficient for the activeness index is also negative and statistically sig
suggesting that producers adopting more active marketing strategies tended to perfor
compared to those who were less active. The impact of marketing activeness on perfor
be discussed by comparing the most and least active producers, along with those with
values for the activeness index. The expected marketing performance of the most active
(5.6) was Cdn$16.19/tonne lower than that of a producer with median activeness index
Cdn$21.58/tonne lower than that of the least active producer (-2.0).
The measure of price variability showed a negative and statistically significant rela
with performance. The point estimate indicates that an increase of 0.01 points in the
of variation would reduce performance by Cdn$2.62/tonne. Results suggest that perfo

in 2007/08, the crop year with largest price variability (coefficient of variation
Cdn$84.07/tonne worse than in 2003/04, the crop year with the smallest price variability
of variation=0.07).

Finally, the binary variables for provinces are both statistically significant, being

for Alberta and negative for Saskatchewan. The estimated coefficients suggest th

marketing performance of producers in Alberta and Saskatchewan was Cdn$1.49/tonne h
Cdn$2.32/tonne lower than performance of producers in Manitoba.

Results for groups of producers categorized by average performance across years are
in the other four columns of table 2. Findings with respect to contract usage indicate
impact of FPC usage on performance is statistically significant and negative for both outp

and underperforming producers. However, differences emerge with respect to th

DPC. Estimated coefficients for both contracts are statistically significant but their s

across groups of producers, as BPC and DPC usage have a positive (negative) relatio

performance for the groups that outperform (underperform) the pool. In line with findi

entire sample, results for timing show significant negative coefficients for all groups

magnitudes of estimated coefficients differ across groups, with outperforming producers
larger values than underperforming producers. This suggests that timing may be more

explaining performance among outperforming than among underperforming producers.
Another characteristic that may differentiate producers is activeness. The estimated c
for outperforming producers is not statistically significant, suggesting activeness had no
their performance and thus they did not have better information or analytical skills to o

the CWB pool. On the other hand, the coefficient is negative and statistically significa
underperforming producers, suggesting that producers with negative average performanc

negative relationship between performance and activeness found for the entire sample.
that underperforming producers were overconfident in their marketing skills, and activ
reduced their performance.

The impact of price variability on performance also differs across outperform

underperforming producers. As can be seen in table 2, the estimated coefficient is neg
statistically significant for underperforming producers, but the signs are mixed for out
producers (negative for those with positive average performance but positive for the to
addition, the magnitude of the coefficients is larger for underperforming than for outp
producers. The evidence suggests that underperforming producers were more affected
variability in the wheat market. On average, performance for producers with negativ
average performance was Cdn$95.40/tonne (Cdn$16.81/tonne) lower in the most volatile
compared to the least volatile crop year, whereas performance for the bottom (top) 10%
was Cdn$l 18.94/tonne lower (Cdn$29.47/tonne higher) in the most volatile crop year com
the least volatile crop year.

The discussion about variables affecting producers who outperform and underperform

can be extended to more refined sets of producers. Table 3 presents results of the panel
estimation for producers who outperformed or underperformed the CWB pool in all crop
marketed wheat with contracts. This criterion is applied to the entire sample and also to

Mattos and Fryza Marketing Contracts, Overconfidence, and Timing 481

Table 3. Panel Regression Models. Dependent Variable: Performance (200
D, ,, , . ,, . ,.. Top 10%b with All Bottom 10%b with

Producers Categorized by Annual Performance „ . . , , ,, .

Positive Annual AH Negative Annual

Variable
Constant

%FPCif

All
Pneitivp3
All
Positive3

-2.97

%DPCit

All Negative2
21.17*"

(3.84)

-0.09"*

-0.04*

-0.10***

0.02

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.04)

-0.13***

0.01

-0.18***

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.04)

(0.05)

-0.10*

-0.14*

-0.08*

(0.04)

0.18***

(0.05)

-10.55***

(3.84)

(4.61)

Activenessi

-1.21*

-1.91"*

(0.66)
255.65***

(10.37)
DAlberta

D Saskatchewan

Adjusted R2
F-statistic

Observations
Producers

27.43***

(2.26)

Timing^

Var,

-3.67

(2.62)

(0.02)
%B1'Cl,

All Mpoativp3 Pprfnrm(inppa
Performance3 Pprfnrmatipp2
Performance"

3.51"

25.27***

(0.56)
-318.43***

(7.29)

(0.06)
-4.66

(6.31)
-0.67

(0.87)
297.19***

(12.50)

-3.34**

3.19

(1.54)

(1.61)

(2.10)

4.30**

0.12

2.85

(1.71)

(1.64)

(2.29)

0.45

(3.52)

-0.02

(0.08)
27.75***

(5.80)
-4.01***

(1.08)
-366.05***

(10.83)
-4.16*

(2.46)
-3.81

(2.77)

0.72

0.52

0.76

195.04

442.93

152.54

192.76

1,930

1,376

1,110

476

878

645

506

234

Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**, ***) indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level.
aAll positive (negative) refers to producers who outperformed (underperformed) the pool in all years in which they used marketing contracts.
Note that producers in this sample must have used contracts in at least two years, but not necessarily in all six years.
b All producers are ranked by average performance across years; the top (bottom) 10% refers to the subset encompassing 10% of the sample
with the highest (lowest) average performance.

bottom 10%. Findings show that all contracts have a negative and statistically significant impact
on performance for outperforming producers. This contrasts with previous findings for producers
with positive average performance, where only the FPC had a negative impact on performance.
Estimated coefficients of contract usage for underperforming producers are either negative or not
statistically significant, with the exception of the DPC for producers with negative performances in
all years. This contrasts to some extent with previous results for producers with negative average
performance, which exhibited significant negative coefficients for all contracts. Overall, considering
all criteria to categorize producers, findings for contract usage suggest there is no strong evidence
that producers might have been able to identify and take advantage of profit opportunities with the
FPC, BPC, and DPC.
The estimated coefficient for timing is negative for the entire group of producers with positive
performance in all crop years, but it is not statistically significant for those coming from the top 10%,

which is somewhat consistent with results in table 2. On the other hand, coefficients are positive
and statistically significant for underperforming producers, differing from previous results, which
showed a negative relationship between timing and performance for producers with negative average
performance. Although timing and performance generally exhibited a negative relationship among
outperforming producers, results are mixed for underperforming producers according to the criterion

adopted to categorize them.
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The impact of marketing activeness on performance is negative and statistically signif

the entire group of producers with positive performance in all crop years, but it is not sta

significant for those coming from the top 10%. This contrasts slightly with results in

which showed no significant relationship between activeness and performance among outpe
producers. Estimated coefficients for underperforming producers are negative and stati

significant, which is in line with results from table 2. Overall, findings suggest a negative rel

between activeness and performance for underperforming producers but offer no clear indicat

activeness affects performance for outperforming producers.

The measure of price variability is statistically significant for all groups, being posit
outperforming and negative for underperforming producers. These results are similar in
previous findings in table 2 with respect to both sets of underperforming producers and th
producers. This suggests that generally underperforming producers were negatively affected
variability in the wheat market, while more refined sets of outperforming producers appear t
from larger price variability during the crop year. The practical implication of these find
also be large. For example, in the year with the highest price variability producers with
(negative) performance in all crop years would have performed, on average, Cdn$81.81/t
(Cdn$101.90/tonne) better (worse) than in the year with the lowest price variability.
Conclusion

This research used data from the CWB to investigate marketing decisions and performance of
Western Canadian producers who grew and priced CWRS wheat with marketing contracts.
particular, this research investigated the marketing strategies of 7,400 wheat producers who use

CWB's marketing contracts in at least two years between 2003/04 and 2008/09. This stud

investigated producers' abilities to identify profitable opportunities with marketing contracts, th
ability to outperform the CWB pool with marketing contracts, the degree of activeness in the
marketing strategies, and how price variability in wheat markets affected their performance.

Regression results for performance relative to the CWB pool suggest that producers are genera
not able to profitably anticipate market developments that occur after they make their marketi

decisions with contracts. The relationship between performance and contract usage is usua

negative or not statistically significant, indicating that marketing larger portions of their crop w
contracts does not improve performance, which is generally the same results found under differ

criteria to investigate outperforming and underperforming producers. This finding could also
explained by other factors. Producers might use marketing contracts mainly for cash flow reason
since they can receive their full payment earlier than if they stayed in the CWB pool. Anothe

possibility is that the main marketing objective is to reduce risk rather than maximize price received

Schroeder et al. (1998) found that approximately 70% of producers in their survey agreed or stron

agreed with the statements "my primary marketing strategy is to reduce risk" and "the goal of

marketing strategy should be to decrease long-term risk over marketing years rather than to focus o

an individual year." Finally, following the discussion by Brorsen and Anderson (2001), produce

might choose marketing contracts based simply on what they used in the previous year or what th

peers are doing, instead of considering carefully how each contract fits in their marketing plan.

Findings from the regression model also suggest that timing has a strong impact on performance

which is in line with previous studies by Cabrini, Irwin, and Good (2007) and Cunningham III,
Brorsen, and Anderson (2007). There is evidence that early (late) pricing leads to better (worse)
performance, both for the entire sample and for groups of outperforming and underperformin
producers. On the other hand, findings about marketing activeness differ from Cabrini, Irwin, an

Good (2007) and Cunningham III, Brorsen, and Anderson (2007). This study finds a negat

relationship between activeness and performance, suggesting that producers who try to time t
market perform worse than those who adopt less active strategies. This implies that producers
may be overconfident in their ability to outperform the pool, since more active strategies tend
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generate poorer performances. Evidence of this negative relationship was part
underperforming producers, while there was little evidence of any associatio
and performance among outperforming producers.
Price variability in the wheat market had a negative impact on performa
producers tend to perform worse in years with higher volatility in the market.

effect appears to be concentrated among underperforming producers, while outp

seem to be able to improve marketing performance during years with higher

suggests that the competence to market wheat in more volatile environmen
skills or new opportunities emerging from market developments—may be one

factors to determine whether producers will have positive or negative perform

In summary, there appear to be two variables that can consistently distin

marketing performance. Underperforming producers appear to be overconfide

time the market and unable to price profitably in volatile markets. On the other

producers show no evidence of overconfidence and seem to be able to perform
pool when the wheat market is more volatile.

Results from this study should take into account the limitations of the d
records of 67,798 producers who grew and marketed CWRS wheat between
with the majority of them choosing to market their crop using the pool. G
adopted to calculate marketing activeness in this research, the actual sampl
who used marketing contracts during those six crop years included 7,400 pro
sample encompasses all producers who used marketing contracts in at least tw
2003/04 and 2008/09, it is still a relatively small portion (about 11 %) of Cana
Furthermore, some producers in the sample did not use contracts in all crop y
obtained in this study do not necessarily reflect the decisions and performan
Canadian wheat producer in an open market environment.
This paper contributes to the ongoing research regarding marketing perf

determinants. Results provide new insights on producers' ability to use different

profitably and how their active marketing strategies impact performance. Findin

should be helpful for the design and communication of strategies for produce
useful as more discussions emerge regarding the deregulation of the Canadian
coming open market environment expected for the 2012/13 crop year.
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